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Abstract
In this note, we consider the impact of job rotation in a directed search model in which
rm sizes are endogenously determined, and match quality is initially unknown. A large rm
benets from the opportunity of rotating workers so as to partially overcome mismatch loss.
As a result, in the unique symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium, large rms have higher
labor productivity and lower separation rate. In contrast to the standard directed search
model with multi-vacancy rms, this model can generate a positive correlation between rm
size and wage without introducing any exogenous productivity shock or imposing non-concave
production function assumption.
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1 Introduction
Job rotation practice is commonly observed in large rms. In the literature, it is well known
that the job rotation policy mainly results from learning of pair-wise match quality between
workers and jobs. However, little work has been done to address the impact of job rotation on the
labor market. One reason is that the study of job rotation requires a framework to simultaneously
consider internal labor market of a rm and external labor market. Yet, in the job search model,
labor economistsfavorite work horse, a rm is treated as a single job vacancy, and therefore it is
impossible to distinguish internal and external labor market. Recently, many job search papers,
including Hawkins (2011), Kaas and Kircher (2010), Lester (2010) and Tan (2011), have shed
light on endogenous determination of rm size, which have the potential to study the interaction
between a rms internal and external labor market.
In this note, we employ a directed search model with multi-vacancy rms to examine the
role of job rotation in labor market. In particular, we assume that a rm can choose its size by
determining the number of job vacancies. A large rm can hire more workers, which requires
higher xed cost. All workers are ex ante identical, but they may be good at di¤erent jobs, which
is initially unknown. The match quality between a worker and a job is uncertain when the worker
is hired, but can be learned afterwards. Large rms can freely reallocate workers over jobs, and
therefore partially overcome the loss of mismatch.
Our main result highlights the impact of job rotation in labor market. In the unique symmetric
subgame perfect equilibrium, we obtain a positive correlation between rm size, labor productivity
and wage, which is consistent with empirical ndings, when the mismatching risk is severe enough.
Without the opportunity of job rotation, however, the correlation between rm size, labor pro-
ductivity and wage is negative for all parameters, which is the result of a standard directed search
model.
Our note is related to the literatures in two ways. First, Meyer (1994) and Ortega (2011)
point out the learning role of job rotation in rms. They provide justication of job rotation, but
both of them narrow the study within the boundary of a single rm. As a step further, we apply
their insight in a competitive labor market model to study the e¤ect of within-rm job rotation
on external labor market. Papageorgiou (2011) is the only note that studies the impact of job
rotation on labor market but with a di¤erent focus. He pays more attention to the interaction
between tenure e¤ect and job reallocation within a rm, while, in contrast, we focus on how
internal labor market in presence of job rotation a¤ects the job allocation on the external labor
market. In his model, rm sizes are exogenously given rather than endogenously determined as in
ours. In addition, he utilizes a Pissarides-Mortenson model and introduces heterogenous rms, so
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the pricing mechanism in his paper is Nash bargaining instead of wage posting, and the search is
random rather than directed.
Second, the directed search model we employed is along the lines of Montgomery(1991), Peters
(1991), Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001), and their later extension by Lester (2010) to multi-
vacancy case. Kaas and Kircher (2011) also study a directed search model with multi-vacancy
rms. However, none of the above can generate a relationship between rm size, wage and labor
productivity that is in line with observations without introducing exogenously dispersed random
productivity. Shi (2002) introduces a frictional product market to overcome this problem. In
his paper, large rms have more incentive to attract workers since they have bigger share in
product market and are anxious to produce enough product. Tan (2011) allows local convexity in
production function to generate a positive size-wage di¤erential. Yet, in our model, the production
function is concave.
The rest of this note is organized as follows. We rst set up the model and characterize the
unique symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium. Next, we derive implications of our model and
discuss the result and compare them to empirical evidences.
2 The Model
2.1 Setup
There are N workers and M rms on the market, both of which are ex ante identical. Denote
 = M=N as the ratio of rms to workers. Note that  is not the labor market tightness since
the number of vacancy is endogenous in this model. Following the literature, we rst consider
individual decision problem given N;M as nite numbers, then we x  and take N;M to innity
to approximate the equilibrium in a large labor market.
A match of a worker-job pair is good with probability  2 (0; 1], and bad with a complementary
probability. If the match is good, we say the quality is 1meaning the worker-job match can produce
1 unit revenue; otherwise, 0. The match quality is initially unknown, and learned later. We assume
the match quality is independent across jobs and workers, even within a multi-job rm.
The game has three stages: job posting stage (I), job searching stage (II) and production stage
(III). At Stage I, the job posting stage, each rm decides how may vacancies to post, k, and at
what wage level, w, where w is potentially a function of k. For simplicity, we assume that they
can create k 2 f1; 2g vacancies with cost C(k), thus the market tightness is  2 [; 2]. Without
loss of generality, we assume convex cost function with C(1) = 0, C(2) = C, 0 < C <  and let
c = C= 2 (0; 1). We assume that wage, w 2 [0; 1], does not depend on any further information
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such as the realized number of applicants and revealed match quality.
At Stage II, the job searching stage, each worker observes (k; wk) of every rm and applies
for the rms that o¤er the highest expected payo¤. We assume that workers can only apply for
a rm instead instead of a specic position in that rm. If the number of workers that apply
for a particular rm exceeds the number of vacancies posted, the rm randomly hire just enough
workers; otherwise the rm hires all applicants. Then the rm assign job positions randomly to
employees. Hence, a workers expected payo¤ from applying for a rm is determined jointly by
both the posted wage and the probability of getting a job.
At Stage III, the production stage, a rm with k jobs and h employees, 1  h  k, learns match
qualities of all P kh = k!= (k   h)! possible worker-job pairs, which have 2Pkh possible realizations. A
large rm with k = 2 has the freedom to assign jobs to employee(s) to derive the highest revenue,
which creates a potential benet margin compared to a small rm (k = 1). For example, if a rm
posts 2 jobs, A and B, and hires 2 workers I and II, it can observe the match qualities of pairs
{(I; A), (I; B), (II; A), (II; B)}, with the value of, say f1; 0; 0; 1g. In this specic case, clearly the
rm shall let I do job A and II goes to B to earn 2 as the total revenue, provided that the rm
pays 2w2 to workers. The job reallocation benet can be fully described as follows. From the point
of view of an employee hired by a two-job rm, his match quality state is s 2 fAB; A B;A B; ABg,
where AB means his match quality is 1 with both job A and B, and A B means 0 with each,
and the both A B; AB can be interpreted as the similar way. For a rm with (k; h) ; h  1, the
optimized payo¤ matrix is given as following tables.
INSERT TABLES HERE
When two workersstate are
 
AB;A B

, the rm can match between I and job B and II and
job A. Hence, the probability to overcome one or two mismatch can generate extra revenue for a
large rm. We dene F (; k; h) the expected revenue function of a rm with (k; h) before match
qualities are observed. For a small rm,
F (; 1; 1) = :
Similarly, for a large rm,
F (; 2; 1) = 1  (1  )2 > ,
F (; 2; 2) =  24 + 43   42 + 4 > 2; 8 2 (0; 1):
and and dene the rate of marginal gain for a large rm as g() = F (;2;2) F (;2;1)

=  23 + 42  
3 + 2, where g() 2 (1; 2) for  2 (0; 1), and it is strictly decreasing in . We highlight two
features here. First, observe that F (; 2; 2)  2F (; 2; 1) =  (1  )2 < 0, meaning the marginal
4
labor productivity in a large rms is decreasing in the number of employees. Second, we model
the learning of match quality and the practice of job rotation in a reduced form. In general,
one can assume innitely many substages in the production stage where the rm can reallocate
workers over jobs in each substage. In the rst substage, given the job allocations at Stage II,
the rm learns the quality of each match. In the following substage, the rm is given the choices
of reallocating workers over jobs and ring workers. This setup can generate similar continuation
payo¤ as our reduced form game.
2.2 Analysis
The solution concept we adopt is symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE), in which
each rm chooses to be a large rm with the same probability and posts the same wage, and each
worker applies for a large rm with same probability. We will solve the game backwards. Given
any history, which will be dened later, in Stage II, the job searching stage, a rm reallocates
workers over jobs optimally in Stage III if possible. Therefore we start from the job searching
stage and characterize the symmetric Nash equilibrium in this subgame for any given history in
which rms play symmetric strategies. Then, we will characterize each rms strategy given the
strategies of workers.
Stage II: Job Searching Stage. The history of job posting in Stage I can be summarize by a
vector H = (w1; ::wM ; k1; ::kM) listing wages and sizes of all M rms. Let H be the set of all
possible Hs. In principle, workers strategy is dened as  : H ! [0; 1]M . Given a history H, a
worker chooses a vector  such that (1) j is the probability that he applies for rm j 2 f1; 2; ::Mg
and (2)
PM
j=1 
j = 1.
Consider the problem of worker i who is deciding whether and for which rm to apply. When
the rest N   1 workers play identical strategies  and rm j posts kj positions and wage wj, for
j 2 f1; 2; ::Mg, this worker chooses strategy ^ to maximize his expected utility
max
^
E^ [
 ()w] =
MX
j=1
^j
kj(
j)wj;
where "

1(
j)

2(
j)
#
=
24 PN 1n=0 h (n 1)!n!(N 1 n)!i (j)n (1  j)N 1 n 1n+1
(1  j)N 1 +PN 1n=1 h (n 1)!n!(N 1 n)!i (j)n (1  j)N 1 n 2n+1
35
=
"
1
Nj

1  (1  j)N
2
Nj
[1  (1  j)N ]  (1  j)N 1
#
:
5

kj (
j) stands for the probability that this worker is hired if he applies for rm j which posts kj
positions. Given any history H, we have  (H) = (j (H)) as the symmetric Nash equilibrium in
this subgame. Dene the market utility level as U (H) = maxjf
kj(j)wjg. Apparently, for any
j (H) to be positive, applying for rm j must deliver the market utility to an arbitrary worker.
Stage I: Wage Posting Stage. Now take one step back and consider a rms problem. A rms
strategy is to choose (;w1; w2) 2 (0; 1)(0; 1)(0; 1), which consists of a probability  to become
a small rm, and a size contingent wage menu (w1; w2). Since we work in a backward order, a rm
expects the forms of  and U. When all the other rms choose  and post wage menu (w1; w2),
if rm j posts a single vacancy, it chooses w^j1 to maximize the expected prot,
(1)
j = max
(w^1)
j
E
h
[1  (1  j

H^1

)N ]
 
  w^j1
i
;
where H^j1 = H^
j
1 (w^1;;w1; w2) = (1; w^1; k
 j () ; w j) represents an arbitrary distribution of sizes
and wages induced by (;w1; w2) of other rms provided that rm j posts a single vacancy and
sets wage to be w^1. The maximization is subject to the following constraint:

1

j

H^j1

w^j1 = U


H^j1

;
otherwise rm j would anticipate zero applicants. The rm js expected prot is the product of
the probability that at least one applicant arrives, 1 (1 j)N , and the expected surplus,   w^j1.
Similarly, if rm j posts two vacancies, a similar problem must be solved:
(2)
j = max
w^j2
E
8>><>>:

1 Nj

H^j2

1  j

H^j2
N 1
 

1  j

H^j2
N  
F (; 2; 2)  2w^j2

+

Nj

H^j2

1  j

H^j2
N 1  
F (; 2; 1)  w^j2
  C
9>>=>>;
subject to

2

j

H^j2

w^j2 = U


H^j2

;
with H^j2 == H^
j
2 (w^2;;w1; w2) = (2; w^2; k
 j; w j). In equilibrium, we have
 
w^j1; w^
j
2

= (w1; w2) =
(w1; w

2), 8j. Meanwhile, we have j = 1 if kj = 1, and j = 2 if kj = 2. Dene  =
max [

1 + (1  )2], and  as the probability that a rm chooses to post one vacancy. Again,
for  to be positive, 1 must equal 
.
Equilibrium Characterization. The equilibrium is characterized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. There exists a unique SSPE in this game. 9 and  such that the equilibrium
strategy prole (1; 

2; 
; w1; w

2) satises one of following three condition:
1. if   , then  = 0 and 1 = 0;
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2. if   , then  = 1 and 2 = 0;
3. if  2 (; ), then (; 1; 2) 2 (0; 1) (0; 1) (0; 1), and in this equilibrium, the wage and
market tightness  in small and large rm market are given by
w1 =
e q1
1  e q1 ; w2 =
q2e
 q2 [F (; 2; 1) + (F (; 2; 2)  F (; 2; 1))q2]
2(1  e q2)  q2e q2 ;
1 = 1=q1, 2 = 2=q2
where q1 = 1N and q2 = 

2N are the queue lengths at a small or a large rm.
1
In the rst two equilibria, there is no heterogeneity in rm size. The intuition behind these
two equilibria are simple. When  is too small, there are so few rms in the market relative to
workers such that it is easy to hire two workers with a low wage. In equilibrium, no rm chooses
to become a small one. Similarly, when  is too large, there are too many rms, and it is hard
and costly to ll both vacancies as a large rm. In equilibrium, no rm wants to be a large one.
In next subsection, we focus on the last case, in which qk is the expected number of applicants at
a rm with k vacancies, and characterize the impact of job rotation on labor market variables.
2.3 Implications and Discussions
In this subsection, we look at some implications of the unique SSPE. The model gives predic-
tions on relationships between rm size and productivity, wage, prot, as well as separation rate,
which are roughly in line with empirical ndings.
In our model, the job rotation rate is trivially increasing in rm size. We can generalize our
model one step further and allow rms to post 1; 2; ::; K vacancies. Now that a larger rm can
overcome the mis-match loss even more via reassignment of jobs, a higher rotation rate shall
appear. This is consistent with empirical ndings by Papageorgiou (2011). We will see how this
higher job rotation benet in larger rms a¤ect the labor market.
Size and Labor Productivity. The average labor productivity of a small rm is , that of a
large rm is a convex combination of F (; 2; 2)=2 and F (; 2; 1), which is greater than  since
F (; 2; 2) > 2 and F (; 2; 1) >  for any  2 (0; 1). As stated before, marginal labor productivity
of a large rm is decreasing in size measured as number of employers, and therefore the production
function of a large rm is concave.
1It is worth noting that the existence of heterogenous rm sizes is due to coordination failure friction rather
than job rotation. In standard directed search model with multi-vacancy rms, one can also obtain a unique SSPE
in which both large and small rms exist.
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Size and Wage Di¤erential. In standard directed search models, if all rms were to o¤er the
same wage, then rms with more vacancies would attract more job seekers as the probability of
lling a vacancy is higher. Hence, small rms must increase wages to compete in the labor market.
In equilibrium, workers are indi¤erent to whichever rm to apply for, and large rms are associated
with low wages. However, this contradicts the observations on labor market2. In our model, large
rms have the opportunity to reallocate workers over jobs and partially overcome the mismatch
between workers and jobs. This job rotation e¤ect within a large rm results in higher expected
productivity, and therefore higher wage in equilibrium. We claim that, when such e¤ect is strong
enough to o¤set the coordination failure, wage premium of large rms arises.
Result 1. Large rms o¤er lower wages than small rms if there is no mismatch,  = 1. For any
c 2 (0; 1), there exist a (c) such that w2 > w1 when  2 (0; (c)).
We provide a numerical illustration of this result due to di¢ cult derivation of an analytical
proof. In Figure 1, w2=w1 is the wage premium of a large rm. When  = 1, we replicate the
result of standard directed search model with multi-vacancy rms, simply because there is no risk
of mismatch. In this case, large rms o¤er lower wage for any positive c. When  is small, it is
possible to obtain the wage premium of large rms. The intuition is as follows. Smaller  implies
a higher probability of mismatch and, consequently, a greater job rotation benet and a higher
wage premium; thus the wage premium is decreasing in . To avoid the inconvenience caused by
the absolute scale of the entry cost, we normalize C as a fraction of , looking at the dimension of
c instead of C in the comparative statics with respect to . When  goes to zero, the entry cost
C goes to zero pro rata.
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
For standard directed search models to generate positive correlation between rm size and
wage, exogenous productivity di¤erence is required. In particular, Kaas and Kircher (2011) and
Lester (2010) assume that rms randomly draw their productivity levels from a pre-determined
distribution before they enter the labor market, and high productivity rms decide to be large and
low productivity rms choose otherwise. If the ex ante distribution of productivity is dispersed
enough, this technology di¤erence can overcome the frictional e¤ect of coordination failure, and
can generate reasonable size-wage di¤erential. In their models, large rm size and wage premium
are the consequence of high productivity. Our model suggests a somewhat reversed direction
of such relationship: even with ex ante homogeneity assumed, large rms may emerge, taking
2For example, Brown and Medo¤ (1989), Oi and Idson (1999) point out that there exists a positive size-wage
di¤erential in labor market.
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advantage of the opportunity of job rotation, which in turn induces high productivity and wage
premium.
Size and Separation Rate. For tractability, we introduce job rotation together with separation
in a combined and induced manner. Nevertheless, it is possible to explicitly model separation
decision by assuming indenitely many substages after initial worker-job match. When a rm
gradually learns its workersmatch quality with all positions, it has the chance to re incapable
employees. Due to the job rotation advantage, large rms have lower separation rate than small
rms in our model. This prediction is also supported by recent empirical work. Papageorgiou
(2011) nds that workers in larger rms are less likely to separate even conditional on the workers
wage by analyzing Survey of Income and Program Participation data.
3 Conclusion
We modied a standard directed search model to explain the size-wage di¤erential observed
in labor market, highlighting the e¤ect of job rotation practice. However, in contrast to the stan-
dard directed search model with multi-vacancy rms, our modied model can generate a positive
correlation between rm size and wage without introducing any exogenous productivity shock or
imposing non-concave production function assumption. We assume ex ante homogeneous rms
and workers, and initially unknown match quality that determines labor productivity. Firm sizes
are endogenously determined. Paying extra cost, a large rm benets from the opportunity of
rotating workers so as to partially overcome mismatch loss. As a result, in the unique symmet-
ric subgame perfect equilibrium, large rms have higher labor productivity and, when explicitly
modeled, lower separation rate.
Appendix
3.1 Proof
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof is essentially same as the proof of existence theorem in
Montgomery (1991), Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001), and Lester (2011). We starts with the
equilibrium of the last case. Fix , let N , M ! 1. Then workersutility from applying small
rm and large rm are given by
U1 =
1  e q1
q1
w1; U2 = (
2
q2
(1  e q2)  e q2)w2
In equilibrium U1 = U2 = U.
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Firmsproblem become
max
q1
(1  e q1)  q1U
max
q2
F (; 2; 2)(1  e q2   q2e q2) + F (; 2; 1)q2e q2   q2U   C
by plugging w1 = U

1 e q1
q1
and w2 = U

( 2
q2
(1 e q2 ) e q2 ) into rmsdecision problems. They yield FOCs
w1 =
q1e
 q1
1  e q1 (1)
w2 =
q2e
 q2 [F (; 2; 1) + (F (; 2; 2)  F (; 2; 1))q2]
2(1  e q2)  q2e q2 (2)
Plugging (1) and (2) into workersutility and rmsprot yields
U1(q1) = e
 q1 ; U2(q2) = e q2 [F (; 2; 1) + (F (; 2; 2)  F (; 2; 1))q2]
and
1(q1) = (1  e q1)  q1e q1
2(q2) = F (; 2; 2)(1  e q2   q2e q2) + F (; 2; 1)q2e q2
 q2e q2 [F (; 2; 1) + (F (; 2; 2)  F (; 2; 1))q2]  C
In equilibrium, rms are indi¤erent between posting one and two vacancies; thus
(1  e q1(1 + q1)) = F (; 2; 2)  e q2fF (; 2; 2)(1 + q2)  F (; 2; 1)q2 (3)
+F (; 2; 1)q2 + (F (; 2; 2)  F (; 2; 1))q22g   C (4)
and workers indi¤erent condition yields
q1 = q2   ln[F (; 2; 1)

+ (
F (; 2; 2)  F (; 2; 1)

)q2] (5)
The equilibrium is pined down by nding a (q1; q2) satisfying (3) and (5).
Combining (3) and (5) yields
e q2 [
F (; 2; 2)  F (; 2; 1)

+ (F (; 2; 1)=
+q2(
F (; 2; 2)  F (; 2; 1)

)) ln(
F (; 2; 1)

+ (
F (; 2; 2)  F (; 2; 1)

)q2)]
=
F (; 2; 2)    C

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The right hand side of above equation is a positive number; the left hand side is strictly decreasing
in q2, equals to
F (;2;2) F (;2;1)

at q2 = 0, and converges to 0 as q2 ! 1; thus there is a unique
solution.
Then dene  as the probability a worker will visit a one vacancy rm. It must hold that
q1 =
N
M
=


; q2 =
N(1  )
M(1  ) =
(1  )
(1  )
Hence, the equilibrium q1; q

2 will uniquely give a 
 = q1(q2 1)
q2 q1 ; 
 = q2 1=
q2 q1 . In any interior
solution, q2  q1 due to equation (5). When q1 < 1 < q2, 0 < ;  < 1, and therefore
0 < 1; 

2 < 1. Following the similar argument of Lester (2011), when
1

 q1, one can prove
 = 1, when 1

 q2,  = 0. Q.E.D.
3.2 Tables and Figures
Table 1: (k; h) = (2; 2)
Employee I
Prob(sI) 2 (1  )2  (1  )  (1  )
Prob(sII) sIInsI AB A¯B¯ AB¯ A¯B
2 AB 2 1 2 2
Employee II (1  )2 A¯B¯ 1 0 1 1
 (1  ) AB¯ 2 1 1 2
 (1  ) A¯B 2 1 2 1
Table 2: (k; h) = (2; 1)
Prob(s) 2 (1  )2  (1  )  (1  )
Employees s AB A¯B¯ AB¯ A¯B
Payo¤ 1 0 1 1
Table 3: (k; h) = (1; 1)
Prob(s)  1  
Employees s A A¯
Payo¤ 1 0
11
Figure 1. Wage ratio as a function of c and .
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